

Message Text

MRN: 1975SALT T000088 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000001 ERROR READING TEXT INDEX
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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2495
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0088
EXDIS/SALT

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE TEXT OF THE U.S.DRAFT THAT A
CORRESPONDING PROVISION IS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PART
OF ARTICLE V, PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE U.S. DRAFT. HERE, TOO,
THE DATE HAS BEEN OMITTED. THE U.S. DRAFT DOESNOT
CONTAIN THE WORD "LAND-BASED." IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET
SIDE THIS IS NOT JUSTIFIES, WHETHER IN LEGAL TERMS OR
IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE.

ARTICLE IV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT ALSO ACCURATELY
RENDERS THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT,
WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO CONVERT LAND-BASED
LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBMS OR FOR ICBMS OF OLDER TYPES
DEPLOYED PRIOR TO 1964, INTO LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS FOR
HEAVY ICBMS OF TYPES DEPLOYED AFTER THAT TIME.

AS FOR THE CORRESPONDING WORDING OF ARTICLE V,
PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE U.S. DRAFT, ALONG WITH COINCIDING
ELEMENTS IT ALSO CONTAINS CERTAIN INCONSISTENCIES WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

THE USE BY THE U.S. SIDE OF THE DIFFUSE AND
INDISTINCT TERM "NON-HEAVY" ICBMS INSTEAD OF THE TERM
"LIGHT" ICBMS SUBSTANTIVELY CHANGES THE MEANING OF THE
OBLIGATION FORMULATED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND
SUBJECT TO INCORPORATION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. LIGHT
AND HEAVY--THESE ARE ANTONYMOUS CONCEPTS. OBVIOUSLY,
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THIS ASSESSMENT PATTERN MUST BE PERSERVED IN INCORPORATING THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. REFERENCES TO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SOME SORT OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET ICBMS, CITED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED CHANGE OF THE WORDING TO BE CARRIED OVER INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT, ARE NOT CONVINCING. CONTRAPOSITION OF THE TERM "NON-HEAVY" TO THE TERM "HEAVY" IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO THE PRECISION OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND CHANGING THE AGREED TERMINOLOGY OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE.

PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE ALSO CLEARLY STATES THAT "THE AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, WHICH CONCERN LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS BY MORE THAN 10-15 PERCENT WILL ALSO BE INCORPORATED (I REPEAT--WILL ALSO BE INCORPORATED) IN THE NEW AGREEMENT." WE ALL KNOW VERY WELL WHAT THIS AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING CONSIST OF.

THE AGREED STATEMENT OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF MAY 26, 1972 SAYS THAT THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE U.S. SIDE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE TERM 'SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED' MEANS THAT AN INCREASE WILL NOT BE GREATER THAN 10-15 PERCENT OF THE PRESENT DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS." THE SOVIET SIDE CONFIRMED THAT THIS STATEMENT CORRESPONDED TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET SIDE. THUS, THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO RECORD THIS IN THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT BY THE SIDES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT PRECISELY CORRESPONDS TO THE CITED PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE.

NEVERTHELESS, INSTEAD OF THIS COMPLETELY CLEAR OBLIGATION CITED ABOVE, IT IS PROPOSED IN THE U.S. DRAFT THAT THE ORIGINAL DEPTH (SIC*) OR DIAMETER OF AN ICBM SILO LAUNCHER NOT TO BE INCREASED BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT.

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IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT ANY INCREASE SHALL BE LIMITED TO ONE DIMENSION, EITHER DEPTH (SIC*) OR DIAMETER. THIS, HOWEVER, IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. YOUR STATEMENT OF MARCH 12, 1975, MR. AMBASSADOR, CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ASSERTION: "WE BELIEVE THAT HIS PROVISION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH SIDES." I WOULD

LIKE TO DISPEL THIS DELUSION COMPLETELY, BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THIS QUESTION SINCE THE TIME THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WAS ADOPTED, AND SUCH AN ASSERTION IS ERRONEOUS AND ONE -SIDED.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

YOU JUSTLY ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY RECORDING PROVISIONS IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON WHICH SYSTEMS MUST BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 CONTAINS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE.

SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE SPECIFIES THAT THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES (2,400 UNITS) INCLUDES LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) LAUNCHERS. ARTICLE II, SUB-PARAGRAPH 2(A), OF THE SOVIET DRAFT CORRESPONDS TO THIS. IN ADDITION, GUIDED BY THE AFOREMENTIONED PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT THE DEFINITION OF A LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHER, IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT WAS ADOPTED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES, BE RETAINED BY MEANS OF AN AGREED STATEMENT. THE REASONS WHY THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO CHANGE THIS DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET FORTH HERE.

ANOTHER TYPE OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE, ACCORDING TO SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES (SLBMS). AS YOU KNOW, AS A RESULT OF COMPREHENSIVE AND
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LONGTHY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SIDES OF THE DEFINITION OF AN SLBM, A CLEAR DEFINITION HAS BEEN FORMULATED IN THE DOCUMENT ON THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIGNED BY THE SIDES ON JULY 3, 1974, ACCORDING TO WHICH "MODERN SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE: FOR THE SOVIET UNION, MISSILES OF THE TYPE INSTALLED IN NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES MADE OPERATIONAL SINCE 1965; FOR THE UNITED STATES, MISSILES INSTALLED IN ALL NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES; AND FOR BOTH PARTIES, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES FIRST FLIGHT-TESTED SINCE 1965 AND INSTALLED IN ANY SUBMARINE, REGARDLESS OF TYPE."

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO

RETAIN THIS DEFINITION IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE U.S. DRAFT, HOWEVER, IT IS PROPOSED TO DELETE SOME INDIVIDUAL WORDS FROM THE AGREED LANGUAGE ADOPTED BY THE SIDES LESS THAN ONE YEAR AGO; THIS SUBSTANTIVELY CHANGES ITS CONTENT. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAS OCCURRED WITH RESPECT TO THIS QUESTION IN THE EIGHT MONTHS SINCE THE SIDES SIGNED THE PROCEDURES? IT IS CLEAR THAT NOTHING HAS OCCURRED, AND THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO CHANGE THE DEFINITION ADOPTED BY THE SIDES.

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2496

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0088

EXDIS/SALT

IN SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREED THAT THE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER BEING ESTABLISHED FOR STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD ALSO EXTEND TO "HEAVY BOMBERS IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED (I REPEAT--IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED) WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF FIRING OF NO MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS."

ARTICLE II, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C), OF THE SOVIET DRAFT ACCURATELY RENDERS THIS PROVISION ADOPTED BY BOTH SIDES.

IN ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE U.S. DRAFT, HOWEVER, IT IS PROPOSED TO INCLUDE AS HEAVY BOMBERS TYPES OF AIRCRAFT "HOWEVER CONFIGURED." AND EVEN MORE. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE MARCH 7, 1975 STATEMENT OF THE U.S.

DELEGATION THAT "HEAVY BOMBER TYPES CONFIGURED FOR OTHER PURPOSES, SUCH AS ANIT-SUBMARINE WARFARE OR REFUELING," ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO "INCLUSION IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ALL AIRCRAFT OF THESE DESIGNATED TYPES, HOWEVER CONFIGURED." NOTE: THIS MISQUOTES U.S. STATEMENT OF MARCH 7, 1975.

THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE AND IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES. I WOULD THINK
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THAT HERE WE ARE DEALING WITH AN ECHO OF DIFFERENCES ON THIS QUESTION, WHICH EXISTED AT ONE TIME IN THE REMOTE PAST AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS, AND WHICH HAVE SUBSIDED LONG AGO.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

DESIRING TO IMPART THE NECESSARY PRECISION TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED RECORDING IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED STATEMENT THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT HEAVY BOMBERS ARE NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT (I REPEAT-NECLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT), FOR THE U.S.-AB-52 AND B-1, FOR THE USSR--TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV , AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT, BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THE B-1 BOMBER. IT IS PRECISELY NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT THAT ARE BEING REFERRED TO, IN VIEW OF WHICH INTRUDUCTION OF THE TERM "TYPE" IS ALSO SUPERFLUOUS. AS FOR THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT DESIGNATED BACKFIRE BY THE U.S. SIDE, AS WE HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS OF ANY KIND FOR INCLUDING IT IN THE CATEGORY OF HEAVY BOMBERS.

IN THE CONTEXT OF DEFINING THE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AN IMPORTANT PLACE IS HELD BY THE PROVISION OF SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH SPECIFIES THAT ""WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE (I REPEAT-EACH SUCH MISSILE) WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES (2,400).

ARTICLE II, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE SOVIET DRAFT ACCRODINGLY PROVIDES THAT "WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY TYPE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT" IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC

WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES TO BE LIMITED.

THE CONSIDERATION EXPRESSED, TO THE EFFECT THAT
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ALLEGEDLY THIS PROVISION IS AN "EXPANDED INTERPRETATION"
OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE LANGUAGE, IS DEVOID OF ANY FOUNDATION.
NO, THIS IS ONLY A STRICT LEGAL FORMULATION OF THE UNDER-
STANDING REACHED BETWEEN THE SIDES.

AND, CONVERSELY, THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE TEXT
OF THE U.S. DRAFT TO THE EFFECT THAT ALLEGEDLY THE LIMITA-
TIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE APPLY ONLY TO AIR-
TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES, IS BY NO MEANS IN ACCORD
WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE
OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY THE SIDES IN CONDUCTING THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT THE TRAJECTORY
CHARACTERISTIC CAN IN NO WAY BE REGARDED AS A CRITERION
OF WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE A GIVEN TYPE OF MISSILE
AS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE. EACH AIR-TO-
SURFACE MISSILE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS,
OR, IN OTHER WORDS, ALL TYPES OF THIS KIND OF MISSILE,
MUST BE INCLUDED AS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES
BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. AND WE HAVE ALSO
SPOKEN ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING THE UNLEASHING
OF A RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN NEW DIRECTIONS,
FOR SUCH A RACE COULD STRIKE A BLOW AT THE NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,
AND AT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

NOW ABOUT ONE OF THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO ESTABLISH-
ING UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS YOU KNOW, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE
CONTAINS A PRECISE PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT "EACH
SIDE WILL BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 1320 ICBMS AND SLBMS
EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY
VEHICLES."

IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS WORDING MOST DEFINITELY THAT
THE SIDES MAY HAVE A LIMITED NUMBER OF ONLY ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS (I REPEAT--ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS), EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVs. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE DOES NOT MENTION ANY OTHER
KINDS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES WHICH COULD
BE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs. THUS, IT IS AGREED BETWEEN

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BOTH SIDES THAT NO OTHER SYSTEMS EXCEPT THOSE DESIGNATED
IN THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT, I.E., ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS, MAY BE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED MISSILES.

ARTICLE V OF THE SOVIET DRAFT IS FULLY IN ACCORD
WITH THIS.

PERMITTING AIR-TO SURFACE MISSILES TO BE EQUIPPED
WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
IS CONTRARY TO THESE CLEAR PROVISIONS OF SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C)
OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. THEREFORE, THE ASSERTION CONTAINED
IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 14 CONCERNING
AN ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSI-
TION ON THIS QUESTION AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE VLADIVOSTOK
UNDERSTANDING CANNOT BE CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED. EXACTLY
THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR DELEGATION HAD ADDRESSED SOME PROVISIONS
OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AND THE EMBODIMENT IN
THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD
UNTIL THE END OF 1985, WHICH IS BEING WORKED OUT.

IN OUR STATEMENT AT THE NEXT MEETING WE WILL CONTINUE
SETTING FORTH THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE IN
THIS CONNECTION.

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2497
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0088

EXDIS/SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

BELETSKY STATEMENT, MARCH 18, 1975

THE QUESTION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING
A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS HAS BEEN ADDRESSED
BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE MEETINGS OF FEBRUARY 18
AND MARCH 4, 1975.

TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THIS QUESTION
AGAIN IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SIDE
OF MARCH 10, 1975.

THIS STATEMENT SAID THAT "...THE SOVIET DRAFT GOES
BEYOND THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING IN INCLUDING AIR-TO-
SURFACE MISSILES 'OF ANY TYPE' IN THE AGGREGATE AND ALSO
IN CONTAINING A BAN ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES ON AIR-
CRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS."

IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE AIDE-
MEMOIRE, IN PARTICULAR, STATES: "WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED
WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN
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600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE
UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC
WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES 2400L."

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5#3 -8\$3-MEMOIRE DIRECTLY PRECLUDES ANY UNDERSTANDING
WITH RESPECT TO THESE MISSILES OTHER THAN APPLYING TO
ANY TYPE THEREOF, IRRESPECTIVE OF POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THEM IN TERMS OF TRAJECTORY, TECHNICAL AND OTHER
CHARACTERISTICS, PROVIDED THAT THEIR RANGE OF FIRING
EXCEEDS 600 KILOMETERS. AS YOU KNOW, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE
DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY KIND OF EXCEPTIONS, ON THE BASIS
OF WHICH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER,
HAVING THE AFOREMENTIONED FLIGHT RANGE, MIGHT NOT BE
COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON
DELIVERY VEHICLES.

THE LANGUAGE QUOTED FROM THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WITH
RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, IS ALL-INCLUSIVE, COVERING ALL SUCH MISSILES OF ANY TYPE, AND BY NO MEANS ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES, FOR INSTANCE.

THUS, THE WORDS "OF ANY TYPE," CONTAINED IN ARTICLE II, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT, ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED IN THE PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH RECORDS THE LIMITATIONS ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS. THE CONSIDERATION PUT FORTH BY THE U.S. SIDE TO THE EFFECT THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORDS "OF ANY TYPE" IS CONTRARY TO THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING IS GROUNDLESS, AS SHOWN BY THE ABOVE ANALYSIS.

AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AIDE-MEMOIRE ALLEGEDLY DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR LIMITATIONS ON ALL TYPES OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, BUT ONLY ON BALLISTIC MISSILES, ARE CLEARLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CONTENT OF THE QUOTED PROVISION OF THAT DOCUMENT, AS POINTED
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OUT EARLIER IN STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES MUST INCLUDE BALLISTIC, AS WELL AS CRUISE MISSILES, INCLUDING THE EXISTING U.S. HOUND-DOG MISSILES. THESE MISSILES, DUE TO THEIR FLIGHT RANGE WHICH IS CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, MUST, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, BE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.

AS FOR THE BAN, CONTAINED IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, ON INSTALLING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS, I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING TO THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED ON THIS QUESTION EARLIER.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS FULLY RETAIN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, REGARDLESS OF WHICH TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT AIRPLANES, MIGHT BE EQUIPPED WITH SUCH MISSILES. CONSEQUENTLY, IF SUCH A POSSIBILITY WERE TO BE ASSUMED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PURPOSES OF AIRCRAFT, THE ASSORTMENT OF

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD EXPAND ON A SCALE WHICH
IS NOW DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS
COULD LEAD TO UNDERMINING THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS, PROVIDED FOR IN THE UNDERSTANDING AT
THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER ARTICLE VIII
OF THE SOVIET DRAFT PROVIDE PRECISELY FOR MEASURES WHICH
PRECLUDE SUCH A POSSIBILITY, AND THEREBY SERVE THE OBJECTIVES
OF STRICTLY ADHERING TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE VLADIVOSTOK
UNDERSTANDING, AND DO NOT GO BEYOND IT, AS SAID IN THE
STATEMENT OF THE U.S. SIDE.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00088
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750095-0732
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750336/aaaabget.tel
Line Count: 514
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 23 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <11 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL BELETSKY, MARCH 18, 1975 (SALT TWO-566)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006